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BOOK REVIEWS
Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, by J. L. Schellenberg. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. x and 217. $33.50 (Cloth).
ROBERT McKIM, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Summary of Arguments According to the author of this carefully argued, well
constructed, clearly written, and original book, we have reason to believe that
a loving God would want all human beings to have a personal relationship
with him at all times at which they are capable of such a relationship. A
personal relationship of the relevant sort involves reciprocity and mutuality:
in particular it involves trust, obedience and worship on our part. Such a
relationship is not to be identified with the beatific vision: it admits of change
and growth, and it may be shallow or deep, depending on our response. It is
impossible for us to have such a personal relationship with God unless we
believe God to exist. So we have reason to believe that God would provide
evidence that renders probable the belief that God exists, thereby rendering
nonbelief unreasonable (33-5). If we had such evidence we would believe
unless our culpable acts or omissions caused us not to do so, for belief is
involuntary and arises in response to the perceived evidence. But this evidence has not been provided, and nonbelief is reasonable. So we have reason
to believe that God does not exist. We have reason to believe that "the
weakness of our evidence for God is not a sign that God is hidden ... [butl a
revelation that God does not exist" (l).
Schellenberg has arguments to show that a loving God would seek a personal relationship with us. He says that "only the best human love could serve
as an analogy of Divine love, and human love at its best clearly involves
reciprocity and mutuality. If I love you and so seek your well-being .. .1 wish
to make available to you the resources of an intimate personal relationship
with me" (18). And he says that "personal relationship with God would
immeasurably enhance our well-being" (ibid.). He rejects the idea that God
might want to be persomilly related to us in the future rather than in the here
and now (25f.). "A loving God ... would bring us into existence so that he
might enter into fellowship with us-for our sakes, but for its own sake too.
We have, then, reason to suppose that there is no time at which some human
being is to some extent capable of personal relationship with God but at which
God does not wish the potential represented by that capacity to be realized"
(26). When he says that "God, if loving, seeks explicit reciprocal relationship
with us" (18, my emphasis) I take him to mean not merely that God wishes
us to have (or is well disposed towards, or is interested in, or would welcome,
our having) a personal relationship with him, but rather that God does everything
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that God can do to ensure that we will react in the desired way. (However,
since we can be unreasonable, and can resist God's overtures, we might fail
to so react even if God were to do everything that God could do to ensure
that we will believe.)
Schellenberg says that even weak belief that God exists would suffice for
a personal relationship with God (32f.). To believe p, however weakly, is to
be disposed to feel it true that p, and to think in terms of p rather than merely
to think about p. A weak belief differs from a strong belief in that, among
other things, it involves more openness to the possibility that one may be
wrong and the disposition to feel that the belief is true is weaker. Weak belief
would be made possible for us if the available evidence were to render the
existence of God even marginally more probable than not: so the probability
that God exists needs only to be greater than 0.5. Nonbelief need not be very
irrational, as it would be if God's existence had a probability of 1 or close to 1.
It would be possible, Schellenberg says, for God to arrange things so that
non belief would be unreasonable. All people who are capable of it could
"have an experience as of God presenting himself to them, which they take
to be caused by God and which is caused by God presenting himself to their
experience" (48-9). This experience might be "an intense [nonsensory] apparent awareness of a reality at once ultimate and loving which (1) produces
the belief that God is lovingly present (and ipso facto, that God exists), (2)
continues indefinitely in stronger or weaker forms and minimally as a 'background awareness' in those who do not resist it, and (3) takes more particular
forms in the lives of those who respond to the beliefs to which it gives rise
in religiously appropriate ways (for example, the believer who pursues a
personal relationship with God may describe his experience as that of the
forgiving, comforting, or guiding presence of God)" (49). The experience
could be universal and uniform. If we knew that many others had the same
experience this would help to confirm the conclusions we would come to on
the basis of our own experience.
Schellenberg considers the possibility that culpable acts or omissions of
the person who does not believe that God exists have caused her non belief.
In his response he does not focus on the easiest cases, namely people who
have had no exposure to theism, including people in nontheistic cultures
whose non belief obviously is not a product of their acts or omissions. Instead
he goes to some trouble to argue that for people in a culture such as ours,
doubt (by which he means in this context uncertainty generated by the belief
that neither the proposition that God exists nor the proposition that God does
not exist is epistemically preferable to its denial) is sometimes inculpable.
To summarize, the argument so far is that the reasonableness of non belief
provides the basis for a prima facie case for atheism. Part 2 of the book is
devoted to consideration of arguments which might be thought to defeat this
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prima facie case. These arguments claim that there are important goods that
require nonbelief to be reasonable. For ease of discussion let's refer to such
goods as goods of mystery. (This is my term, not Schellenberg's.)
Schellenberg discusses a number of versions of the claim that moral freedom is a good of mystery, including Richard Swinburne's claim that "any
too-clear indication of God's existence would render obedience to God eminently prudent and rational, removing temptation to do wrong, and hence
removing the freedom we now possess to form our own characters for good
or ill through our responses to temptation" (116). He considers two relevant
arguments associated with Pascal: the Presumption Argument, according to
which "if God were not hidden, humans would relate to God and to their
know ledge of God in arrogant and presumptuous ways" (139), and the Stimulus Argument, according to which God's hiddenness prompts us to recognize
our wretchedness, and to search for God with contrition and humility (138-9).
He considers the Kierkegaardian claim that God's existence must be objectively uncertain if the highest form of passionate faith is to be possible
(152-167); the claim that it is important that God's existence be less than
obvious since this has the result that we are tempted to deny it, and hence
that this world can be a proving ground in the intellectual sphere as in other
areas; the claim that it is a great good that there is religious diversity, and
that this diversity is possible only because it is not clear to us that a particular
religious tradition is the correct one; and the claim that the uncertainty that
surrounds God's nature gives us opportunities to assist others towards a
personal relationship with God. Schellenberg concludes that each of these
alleged goods of mystery would not, on its own, serve to explain why nonbelief is rational. He also considers the possibility that a number of goods
might together constitute such an explanation. His strategy when he considers
the possibility of such a cumulative case is to give a list of alleged goods of
mystery, including those just mentioned, and to contend that goods that are
roughly of each of these sorts would actually be available if and only if God's
existence were clear and non belief were irrational. Hence, he says, one may
not argue for the importance of non belief being rational by appealing to the
value of these goods of mystery. In addition to there being a counterpart to
each of these goods-a counterpart which would be available only if nonbelief were irrational-there would be this additional good of great import: "the
possibility for all at all times of personal relationship with God ... " (206).
Might there be goods of mystery that we are unaware of? If God exists, it
seems likely that that there are goods which are unknown to us but known to
God. Might some of them be goods of mystery? In discussing this possibility
Schellenberg draws on and extends a debate between William Rowe, Stephen
Wykstra, and others, which bears on this topic. Schellenberg observes that
there may be goods that are unknown to us which do not serve to justify any
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evils, and that even on the assumption that some evils serve unknown goods
it would not follow (even if we assume that God exists and that the absence
of strong evidence for God's existence is an evil) that the form of evil which
consists in the absence of strong evidence for God's existence serves such a
good. Finally, Schellenberg considers this response: "your arguments are fine
as far as they go. But I have independent convincing evidence that God exists.
So even if we do not understand why non belief is rational, there is some such
reason." He thinks the available independent evidence, all things considered,
to be ambiguous. But he thinks that his argument is a serious challenge even
for someone who does not agree with him about this.
Interpretation What exactly does Schellenberg understand himself to have
shown? Part 1 presents "an argument of considerable force from the reasonableness of nonbelief to the nonexistence of God" (83). He has presented a
prima facie case for atheism. He has done so by making a prima facie case
for the soundness of this central argument (A):
I. If there is a God he is perfectly loving.
2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
3. Reasonable nonbelief occurs.
4. No perfectly loving God exists.
Therefore, there is no God.

But the argument of Part 1 is open to defeat: it would be defeated if we came
up with an important good or set of such goods whose achievement would require
nonbelief to be reasonable. In that case premise 2 of A would be false. Schellenberg's view, as we have seen, is that we are unable to come up with any such
goods, and that by the end of Part 2 we have an undefeated argument for atheism
from the reasonableness of nonbelief. So what is the conclusion: what exactly
does Part 2 add? Things get a bit complicated at this point. One complication
arises from the fact that how we ought to respond depends on whether we have
independent evidence for theism and on how much of it we have. Schellenberg suggests that if a theist has overwhelming independent evidence for
God's existence, then if she is convinced by the argument of Part 2, it may
be reasonable that this should merely "exert a certain evidential pressure"
(210), although she certainly ought not to ignore this argument and it may be
that it ought to lead her to perplexity or doubt. Anyone who lacks overwhelming independent evidence for theism has "good reason to suppose that a loving
God does not exist" (9).
In attempting to understand the precise force that Schellenberg thinks his
reasoning to have, it is especially important to understand the status of premise 2 of A. His view is that if premise 2 is true than A is sound (84). Premises
1 and 3, he says, are clearly true; premise 4 follows from premises 2 and 3;
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and the argument is valid. So it all rests on premise 2, for which he understands himself to have given a prima facie case in Part 1. He says at the end
of Part 1 that "the reasons ... [I have given] for supposing that God, if perfectly
loving, will prevent the occurrence of reasonable non-belief are clearly sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he will do so unless an adequate defense
of that claim's denial can be mounted. It follows that A must be viewed as
sound unless such a defense can be given. There is, in other words, a presumption in favor of its conclusion which is defeated only if our support for
[premise 2/ is defeated" (84, my italics). The first sentence in italics here
might be taken to suggest that if an adequate defense of the denial of premise
2 is not available to us, then we may conclude that A is sound. If that were
his meaning, then (given that he understands himself to show in Part 2 that
an adequate defense of the denial of premise 2 is not available to us) his
position would be that by the end of Part 2 he has provided anyone who lacks
overwhelming independent evidence for theism with a proof of atheism.
However, I think that his position is the somewhat weaker one, suggested by
the second sentence in italics, that Part 2 strengthens the case of Part 1
considerably, so that we now have a very strong reason to believe that premise
2 is true and hence that A is sound.
But this is still fuzzy. We can have "good grounds" (or "good reason" or a
very strong reason) to believe p while we have even better grounds or reasons
not to believe p. At times it seems that he may be expressing this very weak
view: for now, and until a rebuttal is to be found, it is reasonable to think
that this case for atheism has something to it, but the jury is still out on
whether some way to show premise 2 to be false will be found, and hence
the jury is still out on whether A is sound. This weak reading is supported by
these remarks: "I by no means wish to rule out the possibility that. .. [a defeater of premise 2] may one day be devised. It is indeed my hope that those
who read this book may be motivated to seek to provide such arguments .
... [My] claim should be construed by theists not as a cry of triumph but rather
as a challenge, an invitation, to find for the problem herein discussed the
solution 1 myself have been unable to uncover" (12-13). On this weak reading
he would not be going far beyond posing a difficulty for theism, inviting
suggestions about how to solve it, and indicating that while he has not found
a solution, others may do so.
But, on balance, 1 think this is what he has in mind: given the arguments
of his book, it is unreasonable for anyone who lacks compelling independent
evidence of God's existence not to be an atheist. That is, there is decisive or
overwhelming reason for everyone who lacks overwhelming independent evidence for theism to be an atheist. And this will remain so until someone comes
up with a defeater of premise 2, and hence a refutation of A, which is something that he thinks is not about to happen since he has explored the likely
candidates and has found them all to be wanting.
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I want to comment further on Schellenberg's notion of a personal relationship. He thinks this relationship to admit of degrees. Although he never spells
it out in these terms, I take the picture to be this. There are intimate personal
relationships, which is what he is referring to when he writes as follows: "[if]
I love you and so seek your well-being, I wish to make available to you all
the resources at my disposal for the overcoming of difficulties in your life.
But then I must also make it possible for you to draw on me personally-to
let you benefit from my listening to your problems, from my encouragement,
from my spending time together with you, and so on" (18). An intimate
relationship, something like close friendship, is also suggested by the fact
that one of his arguments for the view that God would seek a personal
relationship with us is that the best sort of love between human beings involves reciprocity and mutuality. But there are personal relationships that are
not so intimate: no great degree of intimacy seems implicit in the claim that
"God, if loving, seeks explicit, reciprocal relationship with us, involving not
only such things as divine guidance, support, and forgiveness, but also human
trust, obedience and worship" (ibid.). S 1 could guide, support, and forgive
S2 while S2 trusts, obeys and worships S 1, and yet all of this could happen
from a distance: no great degree of intimacy or friendship is required. It seems
that personal relations can range from the relatively impersonal to the very
intimate.
This is important. If a relationship would not count as personal unless it
were intimate, the problem would be that this sort of relationship with God
is emphasized more in evangelical Protestant Christianity than it is in either
non-evangelical or non-Protestant Christianity, or in some other forms of
theism. Many theists put more emphasis on the need to worship and fall
before a God who is mysterious and awe-inspiring, before whom we are as
dust, in whose presence reverence rather than a search for friendship is appropriate for us, and with whom we are not capable of a mutual and reciprocal
relationship. Muslims, with the exception of some Sufis, put little emphasis
on an intimate personal relationship with God: they put more emphasis on
submission on our part, and on compassion, mercy, and justice on God's part.
Many Catholic Christians put more emphasis on a relationship that is mediated by the Church. If a relationship were personal only if it were intimate,
Schellenberg would not have given any reason to reject theistic traditions that
have little place for, or do not greatly value, this sort of intimate personal
relationship. His central argument would therefore not even bear on many
forms of theism. (However, there are various maneuvers that would be open
to Schellenberg at this point. He might argue that all theists, given various
claims they typically make, such as claims about the purpose of human
existence and about the great value of knowing God, ought to value highly
an intimate personal relationship with God, even if they do not do so. And it
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would be something of an accomplishment, if a more modest one than that
to which Schellenberg aspires, to show that forms of theism that emphasize
an intimate personal relationship are problematic.) It seems, however, that
Schellenberg has a broader and more inclusive notion of personal relationship
in mind. But the more this is so, the more room there is for a personal
relationship to be compatible with ignorance and uncertainty on the part of
one of the parties to it. Still, this is compatible with Schellenberg's reasonable
view that at least if there is to be an explicit personal relationship (by which
I take him to mean that it is understood by all the parties involved to be a
personal relationship) the existence of each party must at least be marginally
more probable than not for the other party or parties.
Schellenberg never discusses this, but I think that he would agree that the
difference between strong and weak belief would be reflected in different
prospects for personal relations. He says that "[even] a weak belief that God
exists is compatible with gratefulness, love toward God, trust, contemplation
and the like, for even a weak belief involves a disposition to feel it true that
[God exists] .... If I feel, however weakly, that it is true that there is a God,
I may be moved to praise him and to struggle with him in prayer in ways that
would be ruled out were I to, for example, be uncertain whether [God exists] ... " (32). He seems here in effect to concede that an intimate personal
relationship would require something more than weak belief. While it probably is true that we can feel gratitude, love, trust etc. towards a being whom
we only weakly believe to exist, and while we may praise this being and
struggle with him in prayer, all of this will have a different tenor just because
the belief supporting it is weak rather than strong. Weak belief that God exists
may suffice for exploration, for testing of the waters, even for worship of
some sort. But because of the extent to which it involves openness to the
possibility that one may be wrong-even about the existence of God-the
more robust, more intimate, sort of personal relationship that is made possible
by strong belief would not be possible.
Criticisms 1. Presumably, according to Schellenberg, it is the human side
of a personal relationship between God and us that is difficult (or even
impossible) if non belief is rational. Yet it is clear that if God exists many
people worship God, trust in God, praise God, thank God, etc., under present
circumstances in spite of the fact that, as Schellenberg says, non belief is
rational. The human part of the transaction, at least on a liberal construal of
what such a relationship consists in, is occurring. (As noted above, ifhe construes
the notion of a personal relationship more narrowly so that only an intimate
relationship counts then he has to face the difficulty that theistic religions that
do not value that sort of relationship are untouched by his arguments.)
2. Schellenberg's view is not that God, if he existed, would announce this
fact to us in a loud and unmistakable voice. A "still small voice" would do.
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But a lot of people report on hearing just such a voice: it is striking that the
experiences he describes are just what many people claim to enjoy. More to
the point, a "still small voice" could easily be ignored and could easily fail
to be noticed. The more modest the nature of the experience that must be
enjoyed if nonbelief is to be irrational and a personal relationship is to be
possible, the more plausible it is to suggest that people actually are in this
situation, even if they do not realize it: it becomes intelligible that they could
be in such a situation, and yet not recognize it. If it required road-to-Damascus (or Mount-Sinai, or cave-on-Mount-Hira) experiences, it would be obvious that many people do not enjoy them.
3. It does not follow from the combined facts that our having a personal
relationship with God is a great good, or a good whose achievement is central
to the purpose of our existence, and that we are capable of such a relationship,
that it is right that we should achieve it now. We may not be ready for it now.
It would not follow that it is right that we should achieve this good now even
if our having a personal relationship with God were the sole purpose of our
life, or a sufficiently important purpose of human life that it outweighs all
other relevant goods, even when they are taken together. If we are not now
ready for such a relationship even if we are capable of it, this would provide
excellent reason for a loving God not to seek such a relationship with us now.
(This point may or may not suffice to show that there is not even a prima
facie case for premise 2 of A; if it does not do so, it suffices to show that that
case is only prima facie.)
4. If, say, the good of moral autonomy is a good of mystery, we might call
the good of personal relationship with God a good of clarity. And there are,
presumably, other goods of clarity, including perhaps the good state of affairs
which consists in believing that God exists if it is the case that God exists.
So there are goods of mystery and goods of clarity. This enables us to state
a point about unknown goods which counts in favor of Schellenberg: just as
there may be unknown goods among the goods of mystery, there may also be
such goods among the goods of clarity. Since we do not know what the goods
in question are, we do not know how to classify them. While we have no way
to rule out the possibility that there are more unknown goods on one side
than there are on the other, or that such goods are only on one side, we lack
a compelling reason to think this to be so.
But I am not convinced by what Schellenberg says about the possibility of
a cumulative case for why nonbelief should be rational. I have no room to
discuss this here but I suggest that the appeal to moral freedom can contribute
to such a case. Our being able to decide what to believe about religious
matters in circumstances in which a number of options are rational may also
be a good of mystery. The possibility that unknown goods might contribute
to such a case also needs to be taken seriously. Actually we lack a precise
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way to measure the force of the relevant goods: we lack a precise way to add
up the value of the goods on each side, just as we lack a precise way to
compare goods on one side with those on the other. At best we can make a
rough and ready assessment. Suppose we find, as well we might, that it is
not clear if the goods of mystery outweigh the goods of clarity. Whatever
may be the implications of such a discovery for theism, it would not provide
the basis for the sort of case for atheism that Schellenberg wishes to develop.
To conclude, Schellenberg writes in a religiously sensitive and philosophically interesting way, with a keen sense of what is important to his opponents.
His presentation of the views of others is insightful and balanced. Although
I am not persuaded by his central arguments, I am entirely persuaded that he
has shown that the fact that nonbelief is reasonable is a serious and deep
difficulty for theism. This is an important book.l
NOTE
I. Thanks to Valerie Hoffman and BiII Schaedel for helpful advice, and to John
Schellenberg for extensive comments.

Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, by Nancey Murphy. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1990. Pp. xii and 215. $31.50.

DEL RATZSCH, Calvin College.
Theology, Nancey Murphy believes, has been in the grip of an epistemological crisis since the days of Hume. The crisis resulted from the collapse of the
earlier epistemology of authority, combined with Hume's apparent demonstration that theology, whether revealed or natural, could not meet the new
empirical and foundationalist standards of probabilistic reasoning that had
emerged in connection with science. In her recent Theology in the Age of
Scientific Reasoning, Murphy, professor of Christian philosophy at Fuller
Theological Seminary, argues that advances within philosophy of science, which
represents the best present theories of rationality for probabilistic reasoning, give
theology the necessary resources to finally answer Hume's challenge.
The work is impressive in ambition, scope and execution, and any attempt
to employ contemporary philosophical weaponry against Hume's descendants
on what they have long considered to be their own turf is certainly welcome.
However, while sharing many of Murphy's intuitions and aims, I am not
totally convinced. I shall first recap the major directions of the book, then
indicate areas that may be problematic. But even if there are genuine problems, there is much of value here.
We can perhaps portray the gross structure of Hume's challenge (Chapter
1) as an argument roughly as follows. Theism is rationally justifiable only if

